3.0 O segundo choque

Mudar de canal por causa da publicidade

A crise presente da rádio é tambem a crise de um determinado modelo comercial. «Barnouw (1970) maintained that since radio's inception in the 1920s, the notion of using program content to expose audiences to embedded advertising messages has proven to be a winning business model.» (47); «From a business perspective, Alexander (1997) maintained that the primary goal of radio programming is to maximize the size of an audience targeted by advertisers and the only way to accomplish this goal is to satisfy the needs and wants of that audience. "Uses and gratifications" has long been a popular approach to understanding audience motivations for tuning to radio and television programming. The underlying presumption is that audiences are not passive nonjudgmental receivers of media but are, rather, active seekers of program content that will satisfy specific needs. From practical considerations, such as wanting information about traffic congestion, to more abstract psychological desires, such as relief from emotional stress, listening patterns are determined by each person's expectations of how well different media or programs will gratify their needs (Rubin & Perse, 1994)» (pag 48)

- «(...) among the several motivations for switching stations, avoiding commercials was ranked the highest»(48/49)

- «the dominant motivation for switching radio stations was the desire to avoid commercials or zapping. Tied to this behavior was the tendency to abandon a commercial break almost immediately-even when listening to a "favorite station." Again, these findings are consistent with Abernathy (1991) who found that the first commercial in a break had a better chance of being exposed than later commercials within a cluster.» (60) McDowell and Dick, 2003

As cotações das empresas de rádio nos EUA

CLEAR CHANNEL

$35.42 and only because their buyout price guarantees $36 or else, who knows what it would be worth today. Maybe $9-15? CCU was $91.75 on February 4th, 2000 and after that date the share price was never higher. This is the bellwether stock for radio -- the largest owner with 1,100 stations. No wonder the founding Mays family can't beat it to the door fast enough for one more paycheck. Their legacy may very well be that they single-handedly helped lead the radio industry into the doldrums through inept management and lack of vision.

CBS

$17.17 at closing on Friday. CBS was as high as $88.70 in winter, 2004 although it has paid dividends recently and has been reconfigured away from parent Viacom -- all factors that make it difficult to judge apples with apples. It also includes television -- another dying business with the next generation. CBS Radio President Joel Hollander didn't know what he was doing and when his successor, Dan Mason, showed up, he was smart enough to understand that CBS needed to program to the available radio audience and has tried to rebuild stations while corporate pressures forced him to make cutbacks -- not good.

COX RADIO

$9.95 and beginning to worry Wall Street. Cox stock had been in the $30 range in 1998 and never got higher. Cox President Bob Neil, like CBS' Mason is smart. But Neil is increasingly distracted with the holy jihad he is conducting against Arbitron's People Meter instead of keeping his eyes on his fries. Neil is also wise enough to cut spot loads -- a battle worth fighting publicly. Neil knows radio must tighten inventory and charge more. He should be leading on these issues and not conducting food fights with Arbitron over PPM.

SAGA

$5.62 at the bell Friday. Saga shareholders were no doubt happier in 2002 when its stock priced at $23. Since then it has never been higher. Downhill all the way. Saga chief Ed Christian never strayed from his plan to run a consolidated small market radio company and he deserves credit for that as analysts agree radio is somewhat healthier in smaller markets. Christian surprised at least one of his employees when he joined Cox's fight against Arbitron's People Meter -- some perceiving it as a personal crusade. Misguided to say the least -- as long as more important issues are on the table.

ENTERCOM

$5.18 Friday -- a far cry from $65.88 in Feb 4, 2000 then down you go. Shareholders must have had great faith in Entercom to value it with the big boys but it languishes today through lack of vision and ordinary operating strategies -- a big fall from grace by radio's preferred judgment standard -- shareholder value.

CUMULUS

$2.73 -- a $50 stock in 2002 and then steadily down. Another small market strategy that went awry. Even with the benefit of small market economics Cumulus is getting too close to becoming a $1 stock. This in spite of the fact that the Dickey's knew they needed to get out, but were not able to make a buyout happen in the current financial atmosphere.

EMMIS

$1.56 at the end of last week -- $56.56 in January, 2000 and then never above that high. CEO Jeff Smulyan runs an honest company with excellent assets (I'm speaking about the employees here). But he has a problem -- too much dependence on New York and LA which has been a roller coaster ride -- particularly down lately. Smulyan has tried several times to take the company private and has run into opposition. In my opinion, he was willing to overpay to go private. Guess shareholders aren't that smart. Selling at $19 sounds better to me than closing at $1.56. Nonetheless, even good people with a good leader can't muster more value than a buck and a half.

RADIO ONE

What a great name for this stock since it is worth around one dollar -- $1.05 on Friday. Radio One had worked its way up to $23.30 in May, 2002. The Liggins family has not been able to show vision that has been any better than their peers as this company flirts with being delisted.

CITADEL

83 cents -- you read that right -- 83 cents. Citadel was $22 ten years ago when the ABC merger wasn't even a glimmer in anyone's eye and Citadel has been declining ever since. Citadel is a particular disgrace as a public company because its shareholders see fit to compensate their CEO, Farid Suleman, at the $11 million a year level -- and they pay the taxes as part of his deal. This spits in the face of the Citadel employees who are working at a great disadvantage -- minus a leader who knows the way out of all this trouble. Suleman's accounting background leads him to default to cutting expenses and dismissing talented people rather than investing in a company that could have a digital future.

So, there you have just a few of the reasons the radio industry is in the toilet. There are more. Believe me, I didn't leave out any success stories -- at least from the stock price perspective, their own barometer for success.

Which brings me back to my original premise.

Radio is being run by a few inept people in very influential places.

But even if they are forcing talented managers, programmers, on-air people and sales executives to carry out their budgetary orders, well -- let me quote Eastwood's Gunny Highway here -- "Just because we're holding hands doesn't mean we'll be taking warm showers together until the wee hours of the morning".

COLLIANO, Jerry del, «Grading the Radio Groups » Inside Music Media, 14/07/08

[http://insidemusicmedia.blogspot.com/2008/07/grading-radio-groups.html]

Queixas clássicas

«Listening to the radio is fine when driving near your home, but if your trip is longer than half an hour, you're going to lose reception. You need digital audio in your car. (...) You'll need a way to connect your digital audio to your car stereo:»

Eis algumas hipoteses aqui

O (reduzido) valor da publicidade na rádio

A partir de um estudo divulgado recentemente, algumas conclusões:

- O mercado global de publicidade na rádio vale apenas 9 por cento do bolo (ligeiramente menos do que há quatro anos); Este nove por cento não correspondem às audiencias da rádio e ao seu impacto, havendo lugar a uma subavaliação do impacto da rádio (que, assim, está muito barata).

Share Of Advertising By Medium (2000 and 2004)
	2000	2004
Magazines	15.0%	13.8%
Newspapers	30.7%	30.1%
Outdoor	5.4%	5.4%
Cinema	0.3%	0.4%
Other	1.5%	1.2%
Internet	2.0%	3.2%
Radio	9.1%	8.9%
TV	36.0%	37.0%
Combined newspapers and magazines
	43.9%	45.7%
Source:Analysts/ Institutional Presentation: London, 25th January 2006

Também fica claro que uma hora a ouvir rádio é muito mais barata do que uma hora na televisão, na internet ou mesmo a ler o jornal:

«If the key to media exposure (and thus advertising effectiveness) is the time that people spend reading, watching, using or listening to the medium, says O’Reilly, how much do advertisers invest in reaching their audience?

• Every hour of TV viewing attracts advertisers to spend $40.1 million.
  
• For each hour of radio listenership, its only $19.3 million
  • 
    
  • And for the Internet advertisers only spend $65.4 million, over 50% more than TV
    
  • For newspapers, advertisers spend $316.3 million for every hour of newspaper reading»
  
  
• And for the Internet advertisers only spend $65.4 million, over 50% more than TV
  
• For newspapers, advertisers spend $316.3 million for every hour of newspaper reading»

O estudo completo aqui: http://www.wan-press.org/IMG/pdf/WAN_Savoy_Prese_on_25-01-06.pdf

 

O principal problema da rádio é o excesso de publicidade

O guru Al Ries acha que «Radio is a powerful medium with great selectivity at relatively low costs, but Radiado threatens the very existence of the medium. Too much is too much»: O problema, diz, é que a rádio tem excesso de publicidade. Por isso diz que «For every ad that radio stations used to run, it now seems like they run two. Radio, in my opinion, has become Radiado, an extra "ad" inserted at every possible point in the programming». E no seu dia a dia, «My favorite radio personality is Neal Boortz, a nationally syndicated talk-show host who broadcasts out of Atlanta on 171 stations. I listen to Boortz every morning during the commute to my office in Roswell. Yet at the top of the hour, I turn off my radio and don’t turn it back on until 8 minutes after the hour. Why? Because that’s radio’s black hole. Eight solid minutes of commercials, traffic, weather, news and more commercials. The second black hole occurs at the bottom of the hour, but it’s not quite as bad. I turn off my radio for only 6 minutes». Por isso conclui que «The biggest health problem in America today is obesity. The biggest advertising problem in America today is obesity, too»

fonte: «How Radio Is Becoming RadiADo», AL Ries, Advertising Age, 4/03/07 

Mark Ramsey já comentou: «(...) ask the deeper question: If radio featured significantly less advertising, would that keep listeners away from their CD’s and iPods and satellite radios and TV’s and video games? Indeed, would that make the radio industry a healthier one? Less is not more unless less is zero. Then less is called "subscription."»

Um velho problema: rádio tem menos publicidade do que audiência

«During the Q&A portion of the Cox earnings call on Tuesday, Cox Radio President/CEO Bob Neil said, “We continually fight to try and make advertisers understand what the value of our medium is. It's not unlike the fight that our media brothers and sisters go through all the time.
“We feel like, given the percentage of time we get from consumers we don't get our fair share on the advertising side. We think, given the amount of time people spend with us and our advertising share, we bring a good value to the table for local advertisers and we want to make sure that they realize that.”
«Neil continued, pointing out that “when 93% of the people are listening to radio on a weekly basis that’s a pretty powerful thing.
“Is fragmentation occurring? Sure it is. But it’s always occurred for radio. You (reporter covering the call) write about the iPod. Ten years ago your predecessor was writing about CDs and 20 years before that his predecessor was writing about 8-Tracks. It’s always something.
“The point is, this is a good business. It has a lot of people listening to it. It’s a viable advertising business. So rather than spending all your time finding out what’s wrong with it, it would be great if somebody would spend a little bit of time at least recognizing the positives that are there.
“The facts speak pretty well for our media, and if you’re in some of the other media it’s a lot worse right now, so I’ll take radio, thanks.”»

fonte: «Cox's Neil: I'll Take Radio», radio Ink, 1/03/07 

A rádio é invencível

- Lee Abrams, director do canal satélite XM e conhecido programador dos EUA, afirmou no seu blogue a capacidade de resilência da rádio: «years ago, there was similar talk about when 8 Track, cassette and later CD players were integrated into cars. That same "radio is dead" talk. Radio is resilient. It was given it's last rites in 1955 when TV became mainstream»[1];

---

[1] ABRAMS, Lee, «I-PODS ARE KILLING RADIO !?», Lee Abrams’ Blog, 07/08/06 [http://leeabrams.blogspot.com/2006/08/i-pods-are-killing-radio.html]

A herança do modelo pós televisão (passividade e conveniência)

O modelo herdado /construido a partir da herança televisiva deixou a rádio sobreviver mas amarrou-a a um esquema de consumo secundário extremamente passivo. Por isso há apenas ouvintes (e não os que escutam)?

A rádio é o meio mais passivo de todos; de tal maneira passivo que não precisa de atenção, deixa que quem ouve faça outras coisas em primeiro lugar;

esta é a conveniência da rádio actual, dos ultimos 50 anos. Ora ouvir (usar) por conveniencia não é um bom atributo, um bom trunfo (é pouco...), quando a rádio, continuando a ser conveniente, tiver a concorrência de meios mais convenientesm, deixa de ser conveniente? É o que acontece no presente (e tenderá a acontecer no futuro). Quando houver terminais multimédia operados por voz no carro, quando os leitores de m+úsica já vierem com milhoes de musicas por um baixo preço, a rádio deixa de ser tão conveniente

Para uma arrumação do 3º capitulo

3.0 A rádio tal como a conhecemos; ainda sem o impacto da net; no fundo, a rádio do passado e do presente; a rádio tem sido um sucesso, e um bom negócio; os sinais de crise que se acentuaram sempre estiveram latentes mas não teriam impacto; o sentimento bipolar; três fases: negação, confusão, adesão

3.1 Os sinais de crise que existiam antes do impacto da digitalização (não são os sinais da crise geração iPod): queda nas audiencias; queda nas receitas publicitárias, quena na cotação das bolsas, queixas relativamente à falta de variedade na oferta das progranações e na estagnação tecnológica; as ameaças que apareceram;

3.2 O optimismo; a negação; a historia não se repete [ESTE OPTIMISMO VAI SER UMA CONSTANTE,. UMA MARCA DESTA INDUSTRIA/ACTIVIDADE; APARECE SEMPRE QUE HÁ PROBLEMAS; SEMPRE QUE HÁ DIFICULDADES]

3.3 A net põe em causa a ideia de rádio (transição e hibridismo); os primeiros sinais; evoluir ou reinventar-se?

A rádio estagnada

La radio ha pasado unos años desbordada por la innovación cnológjca y programática de la televisión y ha perdido audiencia por la entrega de la sociedad a ésta. Sin embargo, la adio ha resistido y se mantiene con vigor.» (CHerreros, 2007: 12)

Alternativas à música da rádio

«One of the many reasons radio has lost the next generation is that music stations are unremarkable. They are vanilla. Sound the same. Too repetitious. Too many commercials. Too phony. Not real» (Jerry del Colliano, Radio: Bob Dylan, Program Director, Inside Music Media, 27/06/08 http://insidemusicmedia.blogspot.com/2008/06/radio-bob-dylan-program-director.html) 

(3.2) A rádio está mais viva do que nunca?

(justifica-se este optimismo? um optimismo que esquece as ameaças, apenas vê as oportunidades

«Hoy por hoy, la radio no es un medio obsoleto, todo lo contrario, es el medio más vivo y más inmediato e, incluso, tenemos la posibilidad de escuchar desde cualquier parte del mundo los programas más seguidos y las emisoras líderes del país que más nos lnterese, gracias a Internet» (Peñafiel, 2007: 36) 

(3.0) A segmentação como resultado da lógica comercial?

A rádio que chega até à década de 90 do século passado é basicamente aquela que Lazarsfeld ajudou a idealizar e que Adorno criticou. Mudaram algumas coisas, como o local de escuta, que passou de casa para o carro, e perdeu-se a socialização dessa escuta (de acto colectivo passou a ser individual), mas a rádio é basicamente a mesma, a mesma industria cultural: mesmo a segmentação da oferta, última grande 'transformação' que marcou a rádio pós-televisão, pode ser vista como a evolução natural da procura - inevitável - de públicos mais adequados aos interesses dos anunciantes, que não se importam de gastar mais para ter menos publico, desde que esse público seja o certo (da mesma forma que, há que o reconhecer, essa segmentação da oferta também corresponderá a uma certa segmentação social e cultural ao nível dos mais variados interesses especializados- que a digitalização continua a potenciar, até chegar aos interesses individuais)

Mais sobre a queda de audiências entre os mais escolarizados

«Once I published this article in Radio & Records noting the difference in listening between college grads and non-college grads, I have been rightfully asked the following question: "Has it always been this way?" So I looked at the diary data from the sample of diarykeepers from our longstanding series of studies with Arbitron.

In 1998: Non-College Grads ages 25-54 listened to an average of 102 Quarter-Hours per week

College Grads ages 25-54 listened to an average of 86 Quarter-Hours per week

In 2008: Non-College Grads ages 25-54 listened to an average of 100 Quarter-Hours per week

College Grads ages 25-54 listened to an average of 70 Quarter-Hours per week

In addition, the portion of 25-54s that are College graduates increased from 33% of 25-54s to 41% of 25-54s.  What does this mean? That nearly all the 25-54 losses in TSL over the last decade are coming from college grads. The Non-grads are listening virtually the same amount.» Has Radio Lost the College Grads? Larry Rosin Edison Media research 10/06/08

(3.1) Não é apenas a 'geração iPod' que está a ouvir menos

O que mostra este estudo é que a queda nas audiências de rádio é genérica e não apenas na geração iPod; esta apenas radicaliza este afastamento (mas as queixas são genéricas e não específicas).

O que poderá fazer a rádio: juntar-se aos sucessos em vez de os fabricar

USADO «Perante esta realidade de múltiplas ofertas – juntando a crescente digitalização de milhões de canções, descarregadas legal ou ilegalmente em grandes quantidades, e a multiplicação de editoras que existem sobretudo na Internet (web-labels) – é possível concluir que o consumidor tem o controlo: 1) Os fãs deixaram de estar dependentes da rádio (ou de terem de comprar o disco) para contactarem com determinado artista; 2) Os fãs são cada vez mais interactivos: pedem, exigem, sugerem. Comunicam; 3) Uma canção vive e pode conseguir sucesso sem chegar à rádio. (...)  A rádio, habituada a fabricar os sucessos, confronta-se com uma nova realidade: ter de se associar a esses sucessos para não perder ouvintes – que provavelmente já os conhecem de outros acessos.» (Meneses, 2007: 5)

UMA RELAÇÂO PASSIVA E PERFEITA ENTRE RÁDIO E INDUSTRIA MUSICAL: «A decisão sobre a inclusão ou não nas listas de difusão era, aliás, um dos três grandes problemas colocados pelas rádios à indústria, juntamente com a formatação por estilos de música, que obriga a uma arrumação nem sempre pacífica, e a estratégia das editoras, que procura “vender o máximo de cópias do mínimo de produtos, o que, dada a expansão da rádio aos níveis local e mundial, permite concluir que o aumento do tempo de emissão se fez difundindo a mesma música” (Neves, 1999:74). Tirando estas excepções, indústria e rádios casaram durante décadas sem crises: de uma forma muito simples, as editoras davam a música às rádios, as rádios divulgavam-na. Tudo de borla, portanto, evitando com que as editoras gastassem muito em publicidade e as rádios tivessem de pagar pelos conteúdos que transmitiam (Neves, 1999:73). A construção de programas com base no top de vendas será provavelmente a representação máxima da relação passiva entre indústria e rádio» (Meneses, 2007: 7)

A situação é mais grave do que com a televisão

«Sin embargo el momento radiofónico actual es complejo como pocos en la historia del medio y requiere una abnegada e ingeniosa atención. Y si la circunstancia merece esmero, reflexión y vigilancia es porque la situación es mucho más peligrosa que la generada por la llegada de la televisión. Posiblemente este sea el conflicto más complejo de los vividos por la radio hasta el momento presente porque afecta a su propia raíz. A la radio y - no se olvide-, a los demás medios de comunicación" (Faus Belau in Martinéz- Costa, 2001: 16)

MARTINÉZ-COSTA, Maria (ed) (2001).Reiventar la radio. Pamplona: Ediciones

A tal ideia tantas vezes repetida...

«Radio, shedding talent as fast as it loses audience, is rapidly becoming irrelevant to the younger generation»

fonte: FISHER, Mark, Weakening Signals Washington Post, 1/06/08

A rádio já não é isto

«Depressed by the rise of new technologies and their own fading place in the media landscape, neither those who own and run AM and FM radio stations nor even the new (but not new enough) satellite pay radio services are nurturing the kind of eccentric, iconoclastic voices that made radio so alluring from the 1950s into the '80s. Through those decades, when TV dominated American popular culture, radio was at once a mass medium and a clubhouse, a place where listeners could believe themselves to be part of an unseen community of like-minded people. Today, with the Internet having taken over as the primary provider of semi-private meeting spots, radio stations are cutting costs and bleeding talent, ceding the leading edge to the Web's collection of micro-audiences and the iPod's promise of infinite, but closely held, choice (...) Yet the more I listened to the likes of Pandora.com, Last.fm, Slacker.com and all manner of music blogs and Web radio, the more I heard the sound of automation -- sleek, efficient recommendation engines scientifically selecting the music I am most likely to like, yet missing out almost on what radio once offered: a glimpse into the hearts and passions of personalities who knew what music was new and cool, voices that offered a guided tour of unknown worlds, and sometimes even a frontal assault of the unexpected.» fonte: FISHER, Mark, Weakening Signals Washington Post, 1/06/08

 

 

 

.

 

Ouvintes com formação superior ouvem menos rádio

«In the Spring of 2007, if one aggregates all of Arbitron's diary markets (essentially the whole country except for Philadelphia and Houston), the weekly listening was as follows:

Not a College Grad: 18 hours 45 minutes
College Grad: 15 hours 45 minutes

Incredibly, I've never seen this talked about before, despite the fact that it has been possible to find this data all along. But this finding actually understates the difference. That's because the 'non-college-grad' group includes all the teenagers, who have always given significantly less Time Spent Listening (TSL) to radio. So look at the numbers if we look at listening among 25-54 year olds:

Not a College Grad: 21 Hours 15 minutes
College Grad: 15 hours 45 minutes

Wow. As you can see in Figure 1, below, college grads listen to five and one-half fewer hours of radio per week, on average, than those who have not attained a college education.

Figure 1

 

 

Is it that the programming available from commercial radio is just not appealing enough to college graduates? Has our programming simply chased college grads away from the dial? Or is it that college graduates just have less time available for radio listening and more income to buy replacements like iPods and Satellite Radio, and it is not a function of the programming?» fonte: «Has Radio Lost the College Grads?, Edison Media Research, Larry Rosin, Maio (30?) 2008